Social priorities and the market allocation of credit by Darryl R. Francis
N RECENT YEARS there has been much discus-
sion concerning financial responsibility for the alloca-
tion of resources for social goals. Some contend that
there is a widening gap between the performance of
our financial institutions and the desires of society.
They assert that society is concerned primarily with
the relative shares of total expenditure in individual
sectors of the economy, and that this is inconsistent
with the concern of national monetary policymakers
for aggregate activity and the profit motive governing
the private financial community.
For several decades many economic sectors have
allegedly fared unfavorably from the market alloca-
tion of resources, especially the allocation of credit.
Such sectors include housing, state and local govern-
ments, small business, low income groups,.and agricul-
ture. A natural consequence of this alleged inefficient
allocation of credit has been a number of proposals
designed to improve the system of credit allocation.
In a world of scarce resources the allocation of
credit is an important function. It is a major deter-
minant of the type and quantity of goods and services
available to consumers. This function can be per-
formed either through competitive markets or on the
basis of social priorities administered by the govern-
ment. Allocations through the marketplace are the
result of individual decision-making in the daily pur-
chasing of goods and services. Such purchases mdi-
°Theissues discussed in this speech have been presented to
other groups recently by President Darryl R. Francis.
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cate to producers the type and quantity of goods and
services desired by consumers. Producers in turn pur-
chase resources such as labor and capital to provide
a level of production necessary to meet consumer de-
mands at market prices. In contrast, social priorities
are actually restrictions imposed on the community
by delegated authority. In making the choice between
these systems of resource allocation,we are faced with
issues concerning both economic welfare and freedom.
In this discussion I shall contend that the main-
tenance of maximum welfare in individual sectors is
consistent with both a monetary policy concerned
primarily with aggregates and the profit motive of
private financial firms. Most shortcomings in financial
market perfonnance in recent years were the result of
impediments to the operation of free markets. Credit
controls designed to alleviate alleged hardships often
do not alter resource flows in the socially desired di-
rection. If aid to low income groups is the social ob-
jective, cash payments are a more efficient means of
providing assistance than credit reallocations.
I believe that the market system of credit alloca-
tion is superior to any other system. It provides
greater economic welfare and nmore individual free-
dom of choice. Rather than attempting to improve
welfare in specific sectors, the monetary authorities
can make a greater contribution to overall welfare by
concentrating on the maintenance of national eco-
nomic stability. Given the appropriate actions for
overall stability, market forces will assure that indi-
vidual sectors are treated equitably in a competitive
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Case for Social Priorities Overstated
Most of the impetus for setting social priorities on
credit flows or on goods and services produced has
occurred during periods of great depressions or of high
nominal interest rates (notably agriculture in the
1930’s and housing more recently). When market
rates exceed limits established by usury laws, Regula-
tion Q and other restrictions on savings yields, credit
flows are diverted from normal patterns. These market
barriers have tended to starve some sectors, while
other sectors not subject to the regulations have paid
the market rates and obtained more funds than would
have been available under free market conditions.
Such restrictions, however, probably have little effect
on the total volume of credit or savings.
In order to correct the assumed defects of capital
and credit markets, proposals lmave been made to es-
tablish priorities on credit flows through various finan-
cial agencies, including the Federal Reserve System.tm
Variable reserve requirements against bank assets,
selective open market purchases, the discount mech-
anism, moral suasion, quotas, margin requirements,
and direct controls have been suggested as means for
altering credit flows to specific sectors. If reserves
were required against assets rather than liabilities,
and it was desired, for example, to increase invest-
ment in housing relative to other investments, re-
quired reserves could •be increased on other invest-
ments and reduced on residential mortgages. This
would provide incentive for banks to make more
residential mortgage loans. It has also been suggested
that Federal Reserve Open Market purchases include
FNMA securities, thereby increasing the volume of
funds available for homne mortgages.
Credit Priorities Included in
Pederal Reserve Act
A number of credit priorities were included in the
discount provisions of the original Federal Reserve
1
See Tom Connors, “Variable Reserve Requirement imposi-
tion Opposed by Burns,” New York Journal of commerce,
April 1, 1971, and “Bunting Opposes Fed on Credit Alloca-
tion,” American Banker, April 19, 1971, for discussions of this
subject.
Act. Agricultural paper, for example, was given the
special consideration that maturities of such paper not
exceeding six months (later extended to nine months)
were eligible for discount. Short-term paper, or real
bills, arising from commercial transactions was like-
wise given preference over most other instrnments in
the credit market. Maturity requirements were mnore
stringent for other paper.
With the decline of the discount mechanism as a
major monetary policy instrument in the l930’s, this
means of channeling credit to areas with high priori-
ties declined. Other restrictions on credit, however,
tended to offset this move toward free market alloca-
tion. Margin requirements placed on stock market
credit may have channeled a small amount of funds
to other areas. At the beginning of World War II, the
buildup of defense industries was given high priority
and received aid through the V loan program admin-
istered by the Federal Reserve. Consumer credit con-
trols were instituted about this time, and both con-
sumer and real estate credit controls were used dur-
ing the Korean conflict to reduce credit and demand
for resources in these sectors.2 Following World War
II and the Korean buildup, the central bank reverted
to its pre-war position with respect to credit allocation.
As market interest rates increased in recent years,
Regulation Q and other restrictions reduced credit
flows through nornial bank channels. These restric-
tions probably resulted in a loss of funds to the hous-
ing industry and a gain to other sectors which could
pay market rates for the diverted funds.
Since credit flows are an important determinant of
production, the problem of credit allocation is similar
to that of allocating other resources. The solution de-
pends upon whether the individual should be given
freedom of choice in the marketplace to decide what
goods and services will be available for consumption,
or whether this decision should be imposed on the
individual through social action. It is mny belief that
such rights to choose goods and services for consump-
tion should be left to the individual.
Puhli.c Action Appropriate for
Some Activities
I recognize that a number of functions can be per-
formed more efficiently in the public sector. Main-
tenance of social order, air pollution control, eosnmnon
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economy free from excessive restrictions.
preferences as reflected by demands for
services will provide the incentive for pro-
each sector to acquire necessary resources,
credit, for a level of output consistent with
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defense, and monetary controls provide general bene-
fits which cannot be completely captured by an indi-
vidual. For example, air pollution control, which may
require considerable expenditure by some sectors, pro-
vides substantial benefits to the entire community.
Some producers and consumers in minimizing costs
fail to control harmful waste products. Such polluting
activities which violate the rights of others to clean air
and water must be regulated by government action.
A lighthouse is a classic example of a service that
should be in the public sector. It provides equal
benefits to both owners and nonowners of ships in its
vicinity, and its use by one ship does not reduce its
services for other vessels. We justify expenses for
public education on the basis that all citizens receive
some benefits from the educated individuals. In order
for the public to gain the benefits of such public goods
and services, collective expenditures are necessary.
These expenditures may not provide benefits to tax-
payers in proportion to the taxes collected from each
individual, but the alternative may result in the elimi-
nation of services with a consequent reduction in
welfare to the entire community.
Private Action More Efficient
for Most Activities
In contrast to activities which are performed more
efficiently in the public sector, most economic benefits
readily accrue to the individual without specific com-
munity action, Given the premise that individuals
spend their funds so as to maximize satisfaction, in-
dividual expenditures for goods and services provide
a more efficient guide to producers than do priorities
established by legislative action. The establishment of
legal priorities is simply a method of substituting col-
lective for individual decision-making.
The establishment of priorities involves a tradeoff
of one type of activity or good for another. Total
volume of goods and services produced is not in-
creased. The diversion of resources to enhance output
in one sector, such as residential housing, with a re-
duction of resources in other areas, however, is not
neutral with respect to economic welfare. If marginal
expenditures by each person result in optimum satis-
faction prior to the diversion, the goods and services
foregone are of greater value to consumers than the
gains from the additional houses, In other words, given
the pattern of income distribution, the additional
houses provide less welfare than would have been
provided by the goods and services foregone, as mdi-
cated by free market purchases prior to the arbitrary
diversion. Thus, such socially established priorities
force individuals into a pattern of expenditures which
provides less-than-opthnum want satisfaction.
There is also a possible tradeoff between housing
and other forms of wealth, with no resultant decline
in current consumption. For example, given full use
of resources, more houses couldbe built at the expense
of investment elsewhere without reducing other types
of current consumption. The long-mn impact of such
action would reduce national wealth and goods and
services available for consumption in future periods.
One prime example of the inefficiency of producing
under arbitrarily determined priorities in the United
States is our agricultural programs of the past several
decades. In the 1930’s and again in the 1950’s, farm
incomes were thought to be too low relative to in-
comes in nonfann occupations. We first moved to
remedy the alleged problem by setting a floor under
farm commodity prices with the aid of a government
price support program. Price supports were generally
established above free market levels, thus providing
incentive for production of a surplus of farm products.
Our stocks of farm products, which were purchased
by the government in its price support operations,
soon rose to enormous levels. Numerous measures
have been taken to reduce these stocks, including
subsidized exports, subsidized school lunches, food
stamps to low income groups, a land rental program
to remove millions of acres of cropland from produc-
tion, and crop allotments which arbitrarily limit the
acreage planted to many crops. The alleged problem
and inefficient programs continue.
Fundamental economics tells us that the long-mn
market price is the only price providing just enough
incentive for farmers to produce the quantity of farm
products that will clear the market. It is the onlyprice
which will avoid an accumulation of excesses or short-
ages. The market price is also the only price that will
provide sufficient incentive for labor and other re-
sources to adjust between agriculture and other sec-
tors of the economy so as to maximize overall eco-
nomic output. Other resource combinations will tend
to reduce output and thus the volume of goods and
services available to consumers.
Agriculture, like other sectors of a competitive econ-
omy, is self-adjusting, provided that market forces
are permitted to operate freely. If incomes to farm
resources are too low relative to returns in other
areas, more farmers and farm youth will obtain em-
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ployment in the nonfarm sector. Similarly, if incomes
rise higher in agriculture relative to other sectors, we
will have an expansion of farm workers until returns
to workers of equal ability are equal in all sectors of
the economy after allowance for nonmoney factors.
Our public housing is another example of the waste-
ful use of resources based on public ordering of pro-
duction. Despite the sizable subsidies provided oc-
cupants, a largeproportion of public housing units arc
often vacant, and the operations are in a constant
state of insolvency.
Such waste of resources resulting from public deci-
sions is not limited to our nation or our time. Modern
hotels built by governments of some underdeveloped
countries where few potential customers reside are
now largely vacant. The numerous edifices of the
Middle Ages and the very expensive royal mauso-
leums of ancient times are examples of resource di-
versions which were detrimental to most of the
people.
Social priorities which increase flows of some types
of goods and services, in addition to their inefficien-
cies, are extremely biased against those individuals
who already possess adequate amounts of these goods
and in favor of those who are in the process of pur-
chasing such goods. For example, those persons who
already have adequate homes are penalized when
resources are diverted from other areas through social
action to home building. With fewer resources allo.-
eated to other areas, all consumers must pay a higher
price for nonhousing goods and services. In contrast,
only the prospective home purchaser gains from the
subsidy on home construction or home financing.
It is true that the private sector makes errors in re-
source use. Here, however, the decision-maker suffers
a financial loss when resources are used inefficiently,
giving him great incentive to avoid waste. Obviously,
all individuals and finns do not have equal access to
credit markets, as access is determined in part by the
assets of the borrower. Nevertheless, lending is deter-
mined in part by the anticipated productivity of
capital. Furthermore, the market system minimizes
waste of scarce credit resources and thereby provides
more funds to all productive uses. In contrast, other
methods of allocation offer no assurance that efficient
use of credit will be achieved.
Gash Payments Most Efficient for Welfare
The allocation of goods and services through social
priorities is an inefficient means of providing welfare
to lower income groups. The well-being of the lower
income groups would be enhanced more by money
income than by the same amount of income diverted
to them in the form of housing subsidies. The subsidy
forces a pattern of consumption on these groups which
conforms to the authorities’ tastes, not the individual’s.
The value of this forced spending pattern to the in-
dividual is not as high as the value of an equal
amount of funds. It is, therefore, my conclusion that
efforts to improve the welfare of lower income groups
should be limited to direct transfers of funds rather
than providing particular goods and services. The
supposedly wasteful consumption patterns on the part
of some households are not a sufficient reason for a
government or central bank to alter these patterns.
Our own spending patterns may appear similarly mi-
wise to others; any government edict altering our
consumption patterns detracts from our personal well-
being.
Gontrolling Financial Flows Difficult
In addition to the inefficiencies created by arbitrary
credit allocation, attempts to alter financial flows in
the past have been less than satisfactory. The recent
period, in which Federal Reserve Regulation Q and
other interest rate restrictions limited the yield on sav-
ings accounts, shows the complex nature of credit
allocation.3 While an objective of the restrictions was
to maintain low interest rates to home purchasers,
the reverse was closer to the actual result, Supply and
demand forces in financial markets were not given
sufficient consideration. The flow of savings through
financial intermediaries was retarded, as many savers
invested their savings at higher rates in other assets
not subject to the restrictions. This tended to reduce
the supply of funds to savings institutions — the major
suppliers of home mortgage credit. Mortgage loan de-
mand, however,rose as a result of rising total demand
caused by excessive money creation, and the rates
charged on new mortgages rose sharply. The restric-
tions actually diverted funds away from home mort-
gages and caused higher rates to home purchasers
than would have been charged had banks and savings
and loan associations been free to compete for de-
posits through interest rate adjustments.
The proposed variable reserve requirements on
bank assets may likewise yield unexpected results, As
in the case of Regulation Q, if these restrictions lead
to inefficiencies in banking, savings will bypass the
tmChnrlotte E. Ruebling, “The Administration of Regulation
Q,” this Review (February 1970), pp. 29-40.
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comniercial banking system. The nation’s larger busi-
ness firms have direct access to money markets if
banking efficiency in meeting their demands is im-
paired. Other credit agencies can offset bank credit
diverted from low priority consumer uses.
Commercial banks are only one of several agencies
which channel funds from savers to investors. Esti-
mates published by Bankers Trust Company, New
York, indicate that commercial banks supplied less
than 20 per cent of all investment funds raised in
1969 and ouly about 25 per cent of all short-tenn
funds raised.4 Of the total investment funds supplied,
both the contractual-type and the deposit-type sav-
ings institutions exceeded the quantity raised by com-
mercial banks. The contractual institutions, which in-
clude life insurance companies and private and gov-
ernment pension funds, raised an estimated $23 billion
— more than double the amount of such funds raised
by commercial banks.
Commercial banks likewise supplied a relatively
small portion of the short-tenn funds raised — only
$9.5 billion of the $38.6 billion total. All other savings
institutions supplied $6.4 billion. Almost two-thirds of
the total raised, $24.4 billion, was supplied by other
business corporations. Other investor groups such as
brokers, consumer lenders, and foreign investors were
net users of $1.7 billion of short-tenn funds. These
nonbank sources of investment funds may completely
offset efforts by the monetary authorities to enhance
credit flows to specific sectors.
Federal Reserve Should Goncentrate On
Economic Stabilization
Finally, and probably more important, is the fact
that attempts by the central bank to stimulate or re-
tard activity in specific sectors may not be consistent
with the maintenance of appropriate monetary poli-
cies for economic stabilization. The Federal Reserve
System is eminently qualified to stabilize overall eco-
nomic activity, provided it is not hampered by exces-
sive duties and restrictions which have little in com-
mon with this overall objective. Once the System be-
comes excessively concerned with activity in individ-
ual sectors rather than with the economy as a whole,
its usefulness will be greatly impaired.5
4
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F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Financial In-
stitutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate, March 31, 1971.
It is doubtful that the Federal Reserve can detect
the forces contributing to change in economic activity
in specific areas better than other market participants.
Some lines of activity decline because of changes in
basic supply or demand factors not associated with
financial impediments. Such factors are automatically
detected and acted upon in the marketplace, where
the appropriate resources are adjusted to meet the
changed conditions. Waste of resources is minimized
during the adjustment process. It has been my experi-
ence that the application of specific government pro-
grams to ease the burden of such adjustments has not
only been inefficient but has also prolonged the ad-
justment period unnecessarily. Our programs for agri-
culture are examples of such inefficiency. The Federal
Reserve is not likely to improve on this poor record
of other government agencies by attempting to alter
economic activity in specific sectors through credit
allocation.
The loss by some sectors of rights to equal access to
credit markets, like other restrictions on economic
activity, is a further unnecessary encroachment on
individual freedom. As indicated earlier, any social
action which channels funds to one sector of economic
activity reduces the volume of funds available for
other sectors. This loss of funds to sectors having
lower priority is an impingement on individual rights
to purchase savings at market prices.
Gonclusion
In conclusion, the case for establishing high social
priorities for output in specific sectors of our competi-
tive private economy has been greatly overstated. The
use of legislative action to increase output in specific
sectors is a means of determining through collective
rather than individual decision-making what goods
and services will be produced. We can justify some
collective decision-making during national emergen-
cies on the basis that it is necessary for survival, but
the competitive market is a more efficient allocator of
resources most of the time.
Many suggestions for setting pnorities on credit
flows have occurred during periods of high interest
rates or major depressions resulting from ill-advised
public policies. The maintenance of a fairly stable
rate of growth in the stock of money and removal of
useless regulations will permnit the free-market system
to work efFectively and alleviate roost of the observed
problems.
This country’s record of performance in establishing
social priorities in the private sector has been less than
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successful, Our farm programs designed to correct the
alleged illness of income allocation are examples of
such failures. Earlier price support programs which
ignored basic supply and demand forces were fol-
lowed by more expanded programs to correct newly
observed problems. Like the proverbial punching bag
that expanded elsewhere when punched from the
front, each new regulation created another problem
that required new legislation. We still have not been
able to get the government out of agriculture, and
the expanded programs continue at great social cost.
Such regulations have been a factor in retarding our
farm export markets. They have reduced output in
both the farm and nonfarm sectors of the economy
and have been relatively ineffective in increasing re-
turns to individuals. Their proponents fail to recognize
that resources, including labor, adjust to income in-
centives in all sectors.
To the extent that the authorities are successful in
altering credit flows and production patterns in the
private sector, they reduce national welfare. Produc-
tion based on collective decisions imposes a spending
pattern on the individual that is not compatible with
maximum want satisfaction. If an increase in the wel-
fare of the low income groups is the objective of such
actions, welfare can be purchased at a lower cost
through cash grants than through credit subsidies for
specific goods and services. With cash grants, each
person can obtain maximum want satisfaction for each
dollar spent. In contrast, subsidies of goods and serv-
ices impose the spending pattern of a group on the
individual.
Finally, the Federal Reserve is not an appropriate
agency to be in charge of social priorities. The use of
such mechanisms as variable reserve rates on different
bank assets to alter credit flows increases the problem
of maintaining control over monetary aggregates. Con-
trol over these aggregates is essential for economic
stabilization, More important is the fact that attempts
to maintain economic health in specific sectors of the
economy will detract from the central bank’s overrid-
ing responsibility for appropriate stabilization policies
for the total economy.
If a stable rate of growth is achieved in total eco-
nomic activity, the freely functioning credit and cap-
ital markets will provide the most efficient allocation
of funds to specific sectors. It is through this route of
providing sufficient flows for an appropriate level of
total activity that the central bank can make its maxi-
mum contribution to national welfare.